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NOTE
Valuing the Vulnerable: A Proposed
Approach to Cyclical Competency
United States v. Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668 (8th Cir. 2021).
Kirsten Pryde*

I. INTRODUCTION
The competency evaluation system in the United States is in crisis. 1
The criminal justice system has long recognized that a criminal defendant
has a right to a fair trial, and being competent to stand trial is a necessary
component of that right.2 Mental illness is increasingly prevalent in our
inmate population,3 and while mental illness and incompetence are not

*

B.A., Vanderbilt University, 2020; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2023; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021-2022; Associate
Managing Editor, 2022-2023. I am extremely grateful to Professor Erika Lietzan for
her support and help in narrowing the scope of this project. I am also very grateful to
the Missouri Law Review, Jim Pryde, and Professor Michelle Cecil for their emotional,
mental, and physical labor to help get this piece from a conceptual mustard seed to
this.
1
Barry Wall & Ruby Lee, Assessing Competency to Stand Trial, 37
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 14, 14 (Oct. 29, 2020) (citing W.N. Gowensmith, Resolution or
resignation: the role of forensic mental health professionals amidst the competency
services crisis, 25 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1-14 (2019)).
2
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173–74 (1975); see also Wall & Lee, supra
note 1, at 14–15; Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 19 U.
SAN DIEGO PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RSCH. PAPER SERIES 1, 1 (2004).
3
This is part of a social phenomenon, called the criminalization of mental
illness, which began in the United States just after the deinstitutionalization movement
in the 1970s. Joel A. Dvoskin et al., A Brief History of the Criminalization of Mental
Illness, 25 CNS SPECTRUMS 638, 641 (2020). While deinstitutionalization was a
rational reaction to the horrible conditions of state psychiatric hospitals at the time,
when these facilities disappeared, promised community mental health resources did
not take their place. Kelan Lyons, Competency Exams are Being Used in More
Criminal Cases, Even as Criminal Court Dockets Shrink, CT MIRROR (Sept. 10,
2020),
https://ctmirror.org/2020/09/10/competency-exams-increasing-number-ofcriminal-cases-even-as-criminal-court-dockets-shrink/
[https://perma.cc/N7BTSHGE]. Today, individuals with serious mental illnesses “are overrepresented in
correctional settings.” Dvoskin et al., supra note 3, at 641.
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synonymous, the two are often correlated.4 Unsurprisingly then,
competency evaluation requests have skyrocketed in recent years.5 But
importantly, competency is not static.6 Cycles of compensation and
decompensation may require a defendant to go through the competency
evaluation system multiple times before they are ever brought to trial. 7
Defendants presenting with this cyclical competency are not uncommon,
and Jonathan Mitchell is a prime example.8 Mitchell’s competency to
stand trial has been evaluated at least three different times at three different
facilities located all around the United States.9 When a defendant is
deemed incompetent to stand trial, the government may involuntarily
medicate that defendant for the purpose of rendering defendant competent
to stand trial when the interests of the government outweigh the
defendant’s.10 While involuntarily medicating a criminal defendant is –
surprisingly – nothing new in the United States, this case marks the first
time that a competent defendant has been so ordered.11
From 1990 to 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States shifted
from a high standard for allowing involuntary medication, which required
a showing that the defendant posed a danger to fellow prison inmates and
prison staff, to a more permissive standard.12 This standard allows
involuntary medication even in circumstances where the government’s
T. Szasz, “Idiots, Infants, and the Insane”: Mental Illness and Legal
Incompetence, 31 J. OF MED. ETHICS 78, 79 (2005).
5
Academics cannot agree as to the actual number of competency evaluations
which occur each year – recent estimates range between 25,000 and 94,000 – but all
agree that the numbers have risen significantly over the last decade. Compare DORIS
A. FULLER ET AL., OFF. OF RSCH. & PUB. AFF., EMPTYING THE “NEW ASYLUMS”: A
BEDS CAPACITY MODEL TO REDUCE METAL ILLNESS BEHIND BARS, 1, 1–2 (Jan. 2017);
with Nathaniel P. Morris et al., Estimating Annual Numbers of Competency to Stand
Trial Evaluations across the United States, 49 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 530 (2021);
with Michael J. Finkle et al., Competency Courts: A Creative Solution for Restoring
Competency to the Competency Process, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 767, 768 (2009); with
Wall & Lee, supra note 1, at 14.
6
United States v. Ghane, 593 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Lyons v.
Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 2005)).
7
M.W. Smith, Restore, Revert, Repeat: Examining the Decompensation Cycle
and the Due Process Limitations on the Treatment of Incompetent Defendants, 71
VAND. L. REV. 319, 329 (2018). Note: This article will use gender neutral and
inclusive pronouns unless in reference to an individual with an expressed gender
preference. See Nat’l Couns. of Tchr. of Eng., Statement on Gender and Language,
NCTE
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://ncte.org/statement/genderfairuseoflang/
[https://perma.cc/AZ49-R96E].
8
Smith, supra note 7, at 322–23.
9
See United States v. Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668, 670–71 (8th Cir. 2021).
10
Hollybeth G. Hakes, Forcible Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to
Pretrial Detainees–Federal Cases, 188 A.L.R. FED. 285, 285 (2003).
11
Id. at 673–74.
12
Compare Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,236 (1990); with Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 185–86 (2003).
4
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only interest is in a defendant’s fair trial.13 Nonetheless, this additional
authority was only available where the defendant was deemed incompetent
to stand trial or sufficiently dangerous at the time of the hearing.14
Jurisprudence regarding the constitutional right of an incompetent
individual to refuse unwanted medical treatment generally is murky, and
the right of an incompetent prisoner to do so is even more suspect.15
Courts have never diminished or overruled the constitutional right of a
competent individual, however – even when that individual is a prisoner
or detainee – to refuse unwanted medical treatment.16 Nevertheless, in
United States v. Mitchell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit permitted the involuntary medication of a defendant who was
competent at the time of the relevant hearing.17 This holding defeats the
rationale expressed in the governing precedent of Sell v. United States and
impermissibly intrudes on the defendant’s right, protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to be free from bodily intrusion
by the government.18
Part II of this note introduces the case of Johnathan Mitchell, a man
currently awaiting trial on a robbery charge in an Iowa prison. Part III
analyzes information from several academic disciplines to present the
complex framework associated with involuntary medication
administration. Part IV breaks down the Eighth Circuit’s decision in the
instant case. Finally, Part V proposes a new procedure for courts to
13
For a more complete discussion of Sell proceedings see for example, Elizabeth
Bennion, A Right to Remain Psychotic? A New Standard for Involuntary Treatment in
Light of Current Science, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251 (2013); John D. Burrow & Rhys
Hester, Dazed and Confused: Judiciary’s Role in Sell-ing Psychotropic Drugs to
Inmates and Detainees, 36 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2010); Emily
C. Lieberman, Forced Medication and the Need to Protect the Rights of the Mentally
Ill Criminal Defendant, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 479 (2007); Dora W.
Klein, Curiouser and Curiouser: Involuntary Medications and Incompetent Criminal
Defendants after Sell v. United States, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 897 (2005); Aaron
R. Dias, Just Say Yes: Sell v. United States and Inadequate Limitations on the Forced
Medication of Defendants in Order to Render Competence for Trial, 55 S.C. L. REV.
517 (2004); Cameron J. Jones, Fit to be Tried: Bypassing Procedural Safeguards to
Involuntarily Medicate Incompetent Defendants to Death, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 165 (2004). When the government seeks to compel involuntary medication for
the purpose of bringing a defendant to trial, however, there is no guarantee that such
a trial would be, in fact, fair. Unfortunately, enumeration of this analysis is beyond the
scope of this article.
14
See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 136 (1992); Harper, 494 U.S. at
236.
15
See Douglas S. Stransky, Civil Commitment and The Right to Refuse
Treatment: Resolving Disputes from a Due Process Perspective, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
413, 425–26 (1996).
16
Id. at 424–25.
17
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 674.
18
See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003); U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [], Art. 12

666

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

undertake in such a circumstance that is more narrowly tailored to the
interests at stake.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jonathan Dewayne Mitchell has spent the last eleven years of his life
moving through the criminal justice system because of a single incident.19
Six of those years have been spent in cycles of competency and
decompensation.20 Due to the complex procedural history in this case,
Section A will discuss the facts giving rise to the charged offense, and
Section B will discuss the case’s lengthy procedural history, leading to the
Eighth Circuit’s decision.

A. The Underlying Incident
Catherine Stickley was driving a cab through the dark streets of Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, on April 29, 2011. 21 That night would be Stickley’s last.22
Johnathan Dewayne Mitchell, out on bond on an unrelated assault charge,
was the only named suspect in Stickley’s homicide and was quickly
charged in state court for first-degree murder and first-degree robbery.23
According to Mitchell’s testimony, he came upon Stickley’s body lying
outside her cab.24 At trial, he admitted that he did take money from the
scene to buy crack cocaine but insisted that she was already dead when he
found her.25 The prosecution told a very different story, claiming that
Mitchell needed money for drugs, and he killed Stickley to get it.26
According to their version of events, Mitchell brutally stabbed Stickley
eighteen times in the neck and head, then stole money from her, leaving
behind a bloody fingerprint inside the cab.27 Ultimately, Mitchell was
acquitted of both charges in 2013.28

19

Trish Mehaffey, Johnathan Mitchell Ruled Competent to Stand Trial in 2011
Cabdriver Robbery Case, THE GAZETTE (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:19 pm)
https://www.thegazette.com/news/johnathan-mitchell-ruled-competent-to-stand-trialin-2011-cabdriver-robbery-case/ [https://perma.cc/CQS9-MTN2].
20
Mitchell, 11 F.4th, at 670.
21
Mehaffrey, supra note 18.
22
Tristh Mehaffrey, After Acquittal in Death of Cab Driver, Johnathan Mitchell
Indicted in Cab Robbery, THE GAZETTE (Apr. 26, 2016, 6:10 PM),
https://www.thegazette.com/news/after-acquittal-in-death-of-cab-driver-johnathanmitchell-indicted-in-cab-robbery/ [https://perma.cc/ZEG8-KH43].
23
Mehaffey, supra note 18.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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In 2016, however, federal prosecutors brought new charges relating
to the same series of events. A grand jury indicted Johnathan Mitchell for
“robbery affecting commerce” in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa.29 If convicted, Mitchell could serve up to
twenty years in prison.30

B. History of (In)Competence
Though federal prosecutors first charged Mitchell in 2016, he has not
yet had his day in court.31 Still, he has remained in custody due to
persistent questions regarding his competency to stand trial.32 Johnathan
Mitchell has a history of challenges associated with mental illness. 33 He
carries a dual diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder and
Schizophrenia; his long prison stay has exacerbated both of these
conditions.34 Getting a clear picture of the procedural record regarding
Mitchell’s competence is difficult because many of the court orders and
transcripts are sealed pending a decision on Mitchell’s petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.35 What is known, however, reveals the
complicated logistical path the court has laid for Johnathan Mitchell in the
five years since his indictment.
Mitchell’s defense counsel first moved to have Mitchell’s
competency evaluated three months after his indictment in July 2016.36
After a thirty-day evaluation period, Judge John Stuart Scoles, a magistrate
judge on the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa,
found Mitchell incompetent to stand trial, and Mitchell was taken to the
29
United States v. Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668, 670 (8th Cir. 2021). The Hobbs Act
criminalizes robbery or extortion which affects or interferes with commerce. 18
U.S.C.A. §1951. It is founded on Congress’s plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce. Michael Munoz, Taylor v. United States: In Federal Criminal Law,
"Commerce Becomes Everything", 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 475 (2017). Mr.
Mitchell is charged with Hobbs Act Robbery; thus the government must prove that:
(1) “the defendant coerced the victim to part with property;” (2) the defendant
wrongfully used “actual or threatened force, violence, or fear;” and (3) the coercion
adversely affected interstate commerce. Elizabeth Williams, Litigation of Hobbs Act,
151 AM. JUR. TRIALS 231 §§ 3, 8 (originally published in 2017) (Oct. 2021 update). If
convicted on this charge, Mitchell faces up to twenty years in prison. 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a).
30
Williams, supra note 28, at § 29.
31
See
Offender
Information,
IOWA
DEP’T
CORR.,
https://doc.iowa.gov/offender/view/1106249 (last visited Mar. 30, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/2CVT-BYG] (information current as of March 30, 2022).
32
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 670.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 670–72.
35
Order Granting Motion to Seal the Record, United States v. Mitchell, No. 16CR-0029-LTS-KEM (N.D. Iowa Nov. 15, 2021).
36
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 670.
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Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) medical facility in Springfield, Missouri, for
competency restoration.37 In July 2017, a psychologist at that facility
reported to the court that Mitchell’s competency had been restored, and.
Judge Scoles deemed Mitchell competent to stand trial in September
2017.38 Two months later, however, defense counsel again moved to have
Mitchell’s competency evaluated, reporting that Mitchell had begun
engaging in “unusual behavior” at his new prison facility.39 After another
evaluation period, during which Mitchell was moved between various
facilities within the BOP, in February of 2018, Judge Scoles again found
Mitchell incompetent to stand trial.40 A BOP psychologist opined that the
time in transit between these facilities had contributed to Mitchell’s further
decompensation during this evaluation period.41 After being deemed
incompetent for a second time, Mitchell was committed to a different BOP
medical facility in Butner, North Carolina, for competency restoration. 42
In July and October of 2018, BOP-Butner psychiatrists submitted reports
to the court regarding Mitchell’s status, finding that Mitchell remained
incompetent throughout 2018.43 In March 2019, the federal prosecutor in
Mitchell’s case requested a hearing under Sell v. United States to
determine whether the court would authorize the involuntary
administration of medication to restore Mitchell’s competency.44 On June
25, 2019, Judge Scoles held a competency hearing in which, upon hearing
the evidence, he recommended that the United States’ motion to
involuntarily medicate Mitchell be denied because the Government had
failed to prove it was necessary.45 The District Court adopted Judge
Scoles’s recommendation in October 2019.46
In November 2019, the court received another report from a
psychiatrist at BOP-Butner claiming that Mitchell was competent to stand
trial but that his continued competency was contingent on his willingness
to take his prescribed medications.47 Mitchell’s voluntary compliance
level at the November 2019 report was approximately 60–65%.48 On
December 18, 2019, Michell was transferred from Butner, North Carolina,
to the Linn County jail in Iowa, in one continuous fifteen-and-a-half-hour

37

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 670–71.
41
Id. at 670.
42
Id. at 671.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
38
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drive to attend a competency hearing.49 On January 2, 2020, Mitchell was
deemed competent to stand trial based on the November 2019
psychologist’s report.50
Soon after, however, Mitchell’s defense counsel requested a third
competency hearing, as Mitchell’s condition had rapidly deteriorated
during his stay in the Linn County Jail.51 On February 6, 2020, Mitchell
was moved from the jail in Iowa to a federal detention facility in Seattle,
Washington, for another thirty-day evaluation period.52 In March, one of
the psychologists at the facility reported to the court that Mitchell was still
experiencing psychotic symptoms, evidenced by his poor hygiene,
fluctuating medication compliance, and hoarding tendencies.53 During
this stay, Mitchell was voluntarily compliant with the administration of his
daily medications sixty-two percent of the time.54 Based on this report and
“past forensic evaluations,” Judge Scoles once again found Mitchell
incompetent to stand trial on April 17, 2020, and Mitchell returned to
BOP-Butner for competency restoration on July 28, 2019.55 By September
2020, Mitchell had attained an overall compliance rate of 76.6% at the
facility, and, on October 19, 2020, Judge Scoles found Mitchell competent
to proceed.56
That same month, the Government filed its second motion for
involuntary medication under Sell.57 In November of 2020, a magistrate
judge in Cedar Rapids, Iowa,58 held the requested Sell hearing and, in late
December of 2020, recommended the government’s motion to
involuntarily medicate Mitchell.59 In late January of 2021, the District
Court accepted the magistrate’s recommendation.60 The District Court
then authorized and directed the BOP to involuntarily administer
antipsychotic medication as deemed appropriate by Mitchell’s treating
psychiatrist until and during Mitchell’s trial. 61 The order directed that

Id.; GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink;
then search starting point field for “Butner, NC” and search destination field for “Linn
County Correctional Center”).
50
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 671.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 672. Because the records in this case are sealed, it is
unclear whether Judge Scoles presided on this matter.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
49
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Mitchell’s compliance rate not be permitted to fall below seventy-six
percent per month.62
Mitchell appealed the order to the Eighth Circuit.63 He also filed a
motion to stay the trial court's order while he appealed the case. The trial
court granted the stay.64 Thus, Mitchell has not yet been medicated against
his will.65 Mitchell argued that the District Court had improperly applied
the Sell test to this case because Sell was intended to apply to defendants
deemed incompetent to stand trial on the date of the Sell hearing, but, on
the date of the second Sell hearing, the judge had deemed Mitchell
competent to stand trial.66 However, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision and, as an issue of first impression, adopted the Sell
analysis as to currently competent defendants when considering whether
involuntary medication is necessary and appropriate to force a defendant
to remain competent for trial.67

III. SOCIAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The involuntary medication of criminal defendants exists at a
crossroads of medicine and law and thus requires analysis of these two
fields in concert.68 Section A discusses due process generally, and Section
B discusses due process in the context of prisoners and detainees; the right
to refuse medication generally; and the rights of prisoners and detainees to
refuse medication. Finally, Section C compares medical capacity and
legal competency.

A. Due Process
Competency requirements for a defendant to stand trial are derived
from constitutional due process standards.69 Due process guarantees
freedom from governmental intrusion on individual interests absent an
62

Id. at 670.
United States v. Mitchell, No. CR16-0029-LTS (N.D. Iowa Jan. 22, 2021)
(order granting stay of prior authorization to involuntarily medicate).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 673.
67
Id. at 673–74.
68
See, e.g., Kirk Heibrun & Greg M. Kramer, Involuntary Medication, Trial
Competence, and Clinical Dilemmas: Implications of Sell v. United States for
Psychological Practice, 36:5 PRO. PSYCH. RSCH. & PRAC. 459, 459 (2005).
69
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); see also Wayne R. LaFave et
al., Regulation by procedural due process after selective incorporation, 1 CRIM. PROC.
§ 2.7(a) (4th ed. Nov. 2021 Update) (“Constitutional standards governing defendant’s
competence to stand trial, including the test for competency, the necessity for a
competency hearing, and applicable standard of proof on that issue, also are a product
of due process.”).
63
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established legal process.70 This guarantee is found in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, both of which “prohibit
deprivation of ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”71
Due process is a facially simple doctrine consisting of a two-step
framework, evaluating first the applicability of the Due Process Clause
and second, the adequacy of the process compared to what due process
requires.72 Whether and how much process is due will depend on the
nature of the interest at stake.73
Procedural due process requirements protect liberty and property
interests.74 The requirements of procedural due process in civil cases –
notice and an opportunity to be heard – ensure that the deprivation of a
protected interest will not occur “unless the provided procedures are
adequate to ensure that [the deprivation] will not be affected arbitrarily.”75
This determination focuses on the “appropriate level of procedural
safeguards that must accompany governmental deprivation of the
recognized interest.”76
In Mathews v. Eldrige, the Supreme Court developed an practical test
applicable to procedural due process claims to evaluate the adequacy of a
given process in the civil context.77 The test established three factors to
which a court should look: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by
the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
70
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 1267 (Found. Press, Doctrine & Prac. Series, 2021).
71
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV).
72
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974)) (“Much of Wolff’s contribution to the landscape of prisoners’
due process derived not from its description of liberty interests, but rather from its
intricate balancing of prison management concerns with prisoners’ liberty in
determining the amount of process due.”).
73
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
74
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972). “While this
court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty guaranteed, the term has
received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized … as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
75
Francis C. Amendola et al., Procedural Due Process, 16C C.J.S. CONST. L. §
1822 (Oct. 2021 update).
76
John K. Edwards, A Prisoner’s Threshold for Procedural Due Process After
Sandin v. Conner: Conservative Activism or Legitimate Compromise, 33 HOUS. L.
REV. 1521, 1532 (1997).
77
Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus,
37 HOUS. L. REV. 635, 641 (2000).
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additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s
interest,” which will include an analysis of the “fiscal and administrative
burdens” required by the additional or substitute procedures.78
The doctrinal approach to due process in the criminal context,
however, is less clear.79 The dominant approach, if one exists, requires
that procedural due process requirements be “heavily influenced by
historic tradition.”80 But precedent also reflects that, while historic
tradition can give a procedure “a presumption of constitutionality…the
presumption must surely be rebuttable.”81 Further complicating the
matter, the Court has applied due process requirements differently at
different stages of criminal proceedings.82 While defendants are highly
protected in trial settings, pretrial proceedings “are virtually unregulated
constitutionally.”83
78
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. It is a matter of debate whether Mathews can be
applied in the criminal context. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It claims authority to engage in this sort of ‘judicious
balancing’ from Mathews v. Eldridge, a case involving the withdrawal of disability
benefits! Whatever the merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights
are at issue (and even there they are questionable), it has no place where the
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer.”). The Medina majority
concluded that due process challenges to state criminal prosecutions require a
narrower inquiry. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1992). Because U.S.
v. Mitchell is a federal criminal prosecution, however, it is not clear whether an
evaluation of the Mathews factors would be appropriate. Writing in concurrence to
Medina, Justice O’Connor wrote that “[t]he balancing of equities that Mathews v.
Eldridge outlines remains a useful guide in due process cases.” Medina v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), where the Court applied the Mathews balancing test
in a case concerning criminal procedure). Since Mathews is the only practical guidance
the Court has given to evaluate whether a procedure affords sufficient due process,
this article will use it as a reference point.
79
Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 14 (2006) (“In criminal cases, by contract, there is no clear or uniform
doctrinal approach to procedural due process claims.”).
80
Id. at 15; see Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1996); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355–56
(1996); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407–08 (1993).
81
Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Against the historical
status quo, I read the Court’s opinion to allow some weight to be given countervailing
considerations of fairness in operation, consideration much like those we evaluated in
Mathews. Any less charitable reading of the Corut’s opinion would put it at odds with
many of our criminal due process cases, in which we have required States to institute
procedures that were neither required at common law nor explicitly commanded by
the test of the Constitution.”).
82
Kuckes, supra note 78, at 17.
83
“The net result of the Court’s criminal due process doctrines, as relevant here,
is that the pretrial stages of a criminal proceeding are virtually unregulated
constitutionally, even though serious deprivations may be involved, while the criminal
trial itself is attended by extensive procedural protections, even though criminal trials
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As to state criminal trials, the Court adopted the Patterson approach,
holding that a procedure does not violate due process requirements “unless
it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 84 Apart from
historical practice, a court may also consider “fundamental fairness” in
determining whether a procedure violates due process.85 This alternate
pathway reflects the Court’s modern conception of due process
requirements as being flexible and evolving.86
Substantive due process affords additional protection to certain
fundamental rights, such that no amount of procedure can justify their
deprivation. This doctrine reflects the line of Supreme Court precedent
that arose in the late twentieth century holding that the Due Process Clause
“guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes
more than the absence of physical restraint.”87 Substantive due process,
then, asks a different question: is “there is a sufficient substantive
justification” for such a deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or
property?88
are rarely held. For litigants who go to trial, the criminal model is highly protective.
But for those who do not, the criminal model is decidedly lacking in constitutional
protections when compared with comparable stages of civil litigation.” Id. Zina Makar
argues that this is a direct result of the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). There, the Court took an absolutist approach to
procedural protections at trial which had the unintended effect of placing trials on due
process pedestals. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325; Zina Makar, Displacing Due
Process, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 435 (2018). “Counterintuitively, it had the effect of
watering down procedural protections at the stages surrounding the trial in an effort to
keep costs down based on the assumption that a trial would commence.” Makar, supra
note 82.
84
Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
The holding was primarily dependent on federalism concerns since “the States have
considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process . . .
.” Id.; see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
85
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990); see also Medina, 505
U.S. at 448 (“Discerning no historical basis for concluding that the allocation of the
burden of proving incompetence to the defendant violates due process, we turn to
consider whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of ‘fundamental
fairness’ in operation.”).
86
Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 361–
62 (2001) (“This conception of a flexible, evolving due process meant that history did
not invariably establish either a floor or a ceiling for due process.”).
87
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citing Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
88
Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501
(1999).
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B. Due Process in Context
Due process rights must be evaluated in context. The content and
extent of due process rights can depend on numerous factors, including a
person’s status as either a prisoner or a detainee.89 The first subsection
compares detainees and prisoners. The second subsection discusses the
general population’s right to refuse medical treatment. The third
subsection details a detainee’s right to refuse medical treatment and
includes a specific look at their right to refuse unwanted antipsychotic
medication.

1. A Detainee is Not a Prisoner
Incarcerated individuals maintain some, though not all, of their
Constitutional rights.90 While prisoners and detainees undoubtedly
maintain their rights to procedural due process, substantive due process
rights are not as clearly preserved.91 The Supreme Court has held that
convicted prisoners “enjoy freedom of speech and religion under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments[;]… are protected against invidious
discrimination based on race[;]… and may claim the protection of the Due
Process Clause to prevent additional deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”92 The Court has maintained,
however, that these rights may be subject to restrictions and limitations to
preserve a prison institution’s security and “internal order.” 93
The Court has also identified a potential difference between
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.94 At a minimum, pretrial
89
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)) (“‘Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.’”).
90
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) (“However, while persons
imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights.”);
see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (“We have held that convicted
prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protects by reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison.”).
91
The Court has addressed prisoner’s rights in what can be classified as four
categories: (1) right to access the courts; (2) cruel and unusual punishment; (3)
procedural due process issues; and (4) individual rights (which can include evaluation
of the liberty interests prisoners maintain which could become the subject of a
substantive due process violation). Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoner’s
Rights, 59 FED. PROB. 36, 41–42 (1995). Courts have been least protective of prisoners
in cases decided under the fourth category. Id.
92
Bell, 441 U.S. at 545 (first citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); then
citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
93
Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.
94
See id. at 523 (pretrial detainees are “those persons who have been charged
with a crime but who have not yet been tried on the charge”).
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detainees “retain at least those constitutional rights that… are enjoyed by
convicted prisoners.”95 The Court has gone further, however, finding that
“pretrial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, cannot be punished at
all.”96

2. The Right to Refuse Treatment Generally
The Supreme Court has recognized that a competent individual has a
fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.97 This right is
protected by the collection of: (1) “religious freedom protected by the
First Amendment;” (2) right to privacy jurisprudence;98 and (3) an
individual’s liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.99 For competent individuals, this right
to refuse unwanted care is “virtually unlimited,” even when the care

95

Id. at 545.
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (first citing Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 654 n.40, 671–72, (1977); then citing Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)); see also Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 1249, 1255 n. 8
(2017) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–37) (“Our opinion in that case recognized that
under the Due Process Clause, a detainee who “has not been adjudged guilty of any
crime may not be punished. Wolfish held only that the presumption does not prevent
the government from detaining a defendant to ensure his presence at trial so long as
the conditions and restrictions of his detention do not amount to punishment, or
otherwise violate the Constitution.”).
97
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”); see also
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Thor v. Super. Ct., 5
Cal.4th 725, 735 (1993) (emphasizing that the right to refuse treatment is predicated
on “the long-standing importance in our Anglo-American legal tradition of personal
autonomy and the right of self-determination”).
98
“Courts have cast this right in various terms, often depending on the type of
proposed governmental action, including a liberty interest in bodily integrity, freedom
from restraint, personal security, or as an aspect of the right to privacy.” Stransky,
supra note 14. Whether the right to privacy does in fact support a right to bodily
integrity and whether a right to privacy even exists is beyond the scope of this article.
See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277 (2007); Christopher Quinn,
The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment or to Direct the Course of Medical Treatment:
Where Should Inmate Autonomy Begin and End?, 35 NEW ENGLAND J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 453 (2009); Eugene McCarthy, In Defense of Griswold v. Connecticut:
Privacy, Originalism, and the Iceberg Theory of Omission, 54 WILLIAMETTE L. REV.
335 (2018).
99
Peter Wood, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Courts’ Disparate
Treatment of Incarcerated Patients, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1167, 1167–68 (2008).
96
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“would be medically effective and indeed even lifesaving.” 100 From the
perspective of biomedical ethics, however, both competent and
incompetent individuals retain their right of refusal for medical
treatment.101
In the context of private medical treatment decisions, “the legal
counterpart to autonomy is informed consent.”102 Informed consent
originated from the notion that a physician committed an actionable
assault when performing medical treatment on a patient without the
patient’s consent.103 The doctrine of informed consent imposes a duty on
physicians to inform their patients of all material information about the
treatment to be performed, the risks involved, and the alternatives to the
contemplated treatment.104

3. Meet in the Middle?: A Detainee’s Right to Refuse Treatment
Prisoners and detainees retain their constitutional rights to due
process.105 In Washington v. Harper, the Court explicitly addressed the
involuntary administration of antipsychotics to a currently competent
prisoner.106 The Court determined that Harper had a “fundamental liberty
interest deserving the highest order of protection.”107 That interest was
outweighed in this case only by the physical danger Harper posed in the
prison setting.108
Thirteen years later, in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court
determined when, if ever, the state could involuntarily medicate a pretrial
detainee for the sole purpose of rendering that defendant competent to
100
Robert D. Truog, M.D., Patients and Doctors – The Evolution of a
Relationship, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 581, 582 (2012).
101
Kathleen Knepper, The Importance of Establishing Competence in Cases
Involving the Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medications, 20 L. &
PSYCHOLOGY REV. 97, 104 (1996). This article is limited in scope and thus will not
address the right of incompetent individuals to refuse medical treatment. Because Mr.
Mitchell was currently competent, only the rights of competent individuals are
relevant for purposes of this article. This statement is noted due to the cyclical nature
of Mr. Mitchell’s competency.
102
Samantha Weyrauch, Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: Who
Decides and by What Standards?, 35 TULSA L.J. 765, 769 (2000).
103
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129–30 (1914) (Justice
Cardozo carved out an exception “in cases of emergency where the patient is
unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.”).
104
Paul Jerome McLaughlin, Jr., Can They Do That?: The Limits of
Governmental Power Over Medical Treatment, 37 J. LEGAL MED. 371, 378 (2017).
105
Your
Rights
in
Prison,
JAILHOUSE LAWS. HANDBOOK,
https://www.jailhouselaw.org/your-rights-prison [https://perma.cc/LPQ9-U6ZS] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2022).
106
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990).
107
Id. at 241 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
108
Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
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stand trial.109 Finding that the defendant, Charles Sell, was not dangerous,
the Court, nevertheless, held that the state may authorize the involuntary
medication of a non-dangerous inmate under some circumstances.110 The
Court held that such an order was permissible only in rare
circumstances,111 and formulated a four-pronged test for determining
when such circumstances exist.112 The court must first determine that
important government interests are at stake, including the government’s
interest in bringing a serious crime to trial.113 Second, the proposed
medication must be both substantially likely to render the defendant
competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to have side effects that
will interfere with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.114 Third, the court
must evaluate any less-intrusive treatments and determine that these
alternatives are unlikely to achieve substantially similar results. 115 Fourth
and finally, the involuntary administration of the proposed medication(s)
must be medically appropriate, which includes a consideration of whether
such involuntary administration is in the defendant’s own best interest in
their role as a patient and in light of their medical condition.116

C. The Complicated Concept of Competence
“Competency” requires that an individual possess “the requisite
natural or legal qualifications to engage in a given endeavor.”117 Whether
an individual is sufficiently competent in a given circumstance is a
question for the relevant court.118 Determinations of competency “are
typically situation specific, pertaining to only a single issue or decision.”119
Subsection one will detail the subtle distinction between competency and
109

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
Id. at 185–86.
111
Id. at 169.
112
Id. at 180–81. The Court noted that a court need not apply this standard if
involuntary medication could be authorized by another purpose, “such as the purposes
set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the
individual’s interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk. Id. at
181–82.
113
Id. at 180; Ari U. Etheridge & John R. Chamberlain, Application of Sell v.
United States, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 248, 248 (2006) (summarizing the
factors enumerated in Sell).
114
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; Etheridge & Chamberlain, supra note 112, at 248.
115
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181; Etheridge & Chamberlain, supra note 112, at 248.
116
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82; Etheridge & Chamberlain, supra note 112, at 248.
117
Raphael J. Leo, M.D., Competency and the Capacity to Make Treatment
Decisions: A Primer for Primary Care Physicians, 1 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 131, 131 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).
118
Id.
119
Barry Rosenfeld, The Psychology of Competence and Informed Consent:
Understanding Decision-Making with Regard to Clinical Research, 30 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 173, 176 (2002).
110
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capacity. Subsection two will discuss the various competency evaluations
and their standards.

1. Competency and Capacity Compared
Competence is a legal term of art employed and determined by a
court.120 These legal conclusions are only partially based on clinical
input.121 Indeed, competency determinations are ultimately value-based,
balancing values of paternalism, autonomy, and nondiscrimination to draw
a line between “those who may exercise autonomous choices and those on
behalf of whom… decisions will be made.”122 On the other hand, capacity
is determined entirely by a physician in the clinical context.123 While the
legal system takes extreme precautions to protect individuals deemed
incompetent,124 “[p]hysicians tend to underdiagnose lack of capacity in
their patients.”125

2. Standards of Competence
A criminal defendant is deemed competent to stand trial if they have:
(1) a “sufficient present ability to consult with [their] lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and (2) a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against them.126 A defendant must
communicate with their lawyer to assist in mounting a defense.127 This
requires an understanding of trial-related concepts, like the nature of the
charges against them, the possible outcomes of the prosecution, and the
risks associated with actions like testifying in their own defense.128
Competence to make medical decisions is different from competence
to stand trial.129 Indeed, courts have ruled that a finding that a defendant

120
Craig Barstow, MD et al., Evaluating Medical Decision-Making Capacity in
Practice, 98:1 AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS 40, 40 (2018).
121
Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 176.
122
Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and
Research: Macarthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 104–05 (1999).
123
Barstow et al., supra note 119, at 40.
124
Competency, in the context of this article, refers to the competency to stand
trial.
125
Barstow et al., supra note 119, at 41.
126
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal citations omitted).
127
Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 259, 264–65 (2009).
128
Id.
129
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 495 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The court
equated legal competence…with medical competence…It is plain that these two
capabilities are not the same.”); see also Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care:
Competency to Make Medical Treatment Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil
Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 579 (2012) (“Tests to determine
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is incompetent to stand trial is not dispositive of their medical
competency.130 There is no uniform approach to determining competency
to make medical decisions, but most jurisdictions use some combination
of these four factors:131 (1) communicating a choice;132 (2) understanding
relevant information;133 (3) appreciating attendant consequences and
implications;134 and (4) rationally manipulating information.135 These
standards, however, paint competence in black and white, drawing a sharp
line in the sand. In reality, many patients will exist “on the borderline of
mental competence.”136

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judges Loken, Kelly, and Erickson of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s order authorizing the involuntary medication of defendant
Johnathan Mitchell.137 The court held that the four-part Sell standard
applied in all cases where the government seeks involuntary medication of
a criminal defendant,138 regardless of whether that defendant is deemed
competent or incompetent to stand trial.139
Mitchell argued that Sell is inapplicable in this case because the Sell
standard was intended to be constrained to situations in which the
defendant is currently incompetent.140 Mitchell emphasized the use of
competence to make medical treatment decisions assess an individual’s capacity for
rational decision making.”).
130
See, e.g., Charters, 829 F.2d at 495.
131
Jessica Wilen Berg, J.D. et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345,
351 (1996) (“[These] components are actually reflected in, and in fact drawn from the
law.”).
132
Id. at 352. Inability to reach or communicate a decision “is demonstrated by
a patient who simply cannot make up [their] mind or vacillates to such a degree that it
is impossible to implement a treatment choice.” Id.
133
Id. at 353–54. Understanding, as separated from appreciation, “is simply the
ability to comprehend the concepts involved . . . it does not require the patient to
comprehend the situation as a whole.” Id.
134
Id. at 355–57. Appreciation involves applying this understood information to
one’s own circumstances. Id. at 355. The patient must be able to “appreciate the nature
of the situation and the likely effect of treatment.” Id.
135
Id. at 357. The rational manipulation criterion “addresses the patient’s
reasoning capacity or ability to employ logical thought processes to compare the risks
and benefits of treatment options;” it is concerned more with the decision making
process than with the particular outcome reached. Id.
136
Jonathan Herring, Entering the Fog: On the Borderlines of Mental Capacity,
83 IND. L.J. 1619, 1622 (2008).
137
United States v. Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668, 670 (8th Cir. 2021).
138
Id. at 673–74.
139
Id. at 673.
140
Id.
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“render” in the standard, arguing that incompetence was a necessary
precondition to applying the Sell test.141 The court, however, took a
different approach to the word “render,” holding that the governmental
interest of “rendering the defendant competent to stand trial” may include
the involuntary administration of medication to maintain the defendant’s
competency.142
The judges were concerned with preventing a situation like
Mitchell’s, describing him as “a defendant who cycles in and out of
competency indefinitely and who may never be able to stand trial if the
cycle continues.”143 They rationalized that adopting a rule otherwise
would allow a defendant who “has regained competency for some period
of time, but who is unable to maintain it, [to] frustrate… an important
governmental interest.”144 The opinion holds, on an issue of first
impression, that the District Court had the authority, pursuant to Sell, to
order the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications to
Mitchell to “render and maintain his competency for trial,” even though
he was deemed competent at the time that the relevant Sell hearing took
place.145
The opinion then applied the Sell standard to the case at bar.146
Mitchell argued that the District Court had erred in finding that the
involuntary medication is necessary to further the State’s interests in the
case.147 The court emphasized the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Graddy,
who testified that therapy and supportive housing are beneficial in treating
schizophrenia but deemed antipsychotic medication the “best”
treatment.148 In analyzing whether such intrusive steps are necessary, the
court rejected the threat of a contempt order as a viable less-intrusive
alternative to involuntary medication, basing their determination on
Mitchell’s financially impoverished state and his continued stay in federal
custody regardless of such an order.149 The court then implicitly
determined that Mitchell would not continue to take his medication
voluntarily under any circumstances, and thus found that the order was
necessary.150

141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 673.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 674.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See id. (“Mitchell’s sporadic compliance also supports the district court’s
finding that ‘Mitchell has demonstrated a pattern of failing to voluntarily maintain a
medication regiment upon becoming competent.’”).
142
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The court ultimately held that the Sell standard broadly applied to all
cases, determining the circumstances in which the government may obtain
a court order to involuntarily administer medication to a defendant where
competency for trial is the sole governmental interest at stake.151 Applying
the Sell standard, the court held that the District Court correctly found that
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications to Johnathan
Mitchell was “necessary to further the government’s interests.” 152

V. COMMENT
Sell v. United States has been cited at least 662 times since the
opinion was handed down in 2003,153 despite the justices’ stated intent
that the test be used only in certain, rare instances.154 The Eighth Circuit’s
decision in U.S. v. Mitchell would have courts apply the Sell standard in
even more circumstances than the Supreme Court originally predicted or
intended.155 This expansion is impermissible for defendants like Mitchell,
who have been deemed competent to stand trial. The state and the court,
however, point to an important justification to use Sell: the desire not to
waste judicial resources by playing a timing game with cyclically
competent defendants.156 Nevertheless, this interest could be better served
by using a different procedure and a different competency standard. The
Sell standard did not provide Mitchell due process of law in this case. In
cases involving cyclically competent defendants, courts should alter their
core inquiry from whether the defendant is competent to stand trial to
whether the defendant is competent to refuse medication.

151

Id. at 673–74.
Id. at 674.
153
Westlaw citing references of cases citing Sell v. U.S. for at least one of seven
relevant headnotes: (1) constitutional law, administration of drugs; (2) mental health,
forced medication is an irreversible harm; (3) mental health, must weigh the facts
against the government’s interest in prosecution; (4) mental health, Sell’s standard for
allowing involuntary medication; (5) mental health, no less intrusive means; (6)
mental health, drugs must be in defendant’s medical interest; (7) mental health, unless
defendant is dangerous the court must weigh the Sell factors. Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S.
166 (2003).
154
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“This standard will permit involuntary administration
of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But those instances
may be rare.”).
155
Id.; Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 668.
156
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 674.
152
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A. Mitchell Did Not Receive Due Process of Law
Due process is a two-step inquiry.157 Testing its sufficiency requires
a court to weigh the individual’s private interests against the government’s
interest.158 Here, the Eighth Circuit found that Mitchell’s private interest
in bodily autonomy did not outweigh the government’s interest in bringing
criminal defendants to trial.159 The court, however, did not give Mitchell’s
private interest in being free of bodily intrusion sufficient analytical
weight, which allowed the state’s interest to prevail. Alternatively, even
if the court did give proper weight to Mitchell’s interest, the procedure
itself did not meet procedural due process requirements.

1. The Court Undervalued Mitchell’s Interest in Bodily Autonomy
The United States has long recognized the extreme importance of the
right to bodily integrity and autonomy.160 Whether recognized under
right-to-privacy jurisprudence or as a significant liberty interest, the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment is a constitutionally protected
interest.161 This right, however, is not the same in both competent and
incompetent persons and has only been recognized in competent
individuals.162 In Mitchell, the Eighth Circuit glossed over this distinction,
pointing straight to the government interest at stake.163 By pointing to the
government interest, the court did not consider the weightiness of the
private interest at stake – a competent criminal defendant’s right to bodily
autonomy.164
Law treats competent individuals and incompetent
157
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)
(“But determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause
does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent’s constitutional rights have been
violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests.’”) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
158
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)) (“‘(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’”).
159
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 674.
160
See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.”). This right is arguably so deeply rooted in this nation’s jurisprudence that the
right has become fundamental. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21
(1997). This argument, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
161
“The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions.” Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
162
See id. at 279–80.
163
Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 673.
164
Id.; see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
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individuals differently – more willingly overriding decisions made by
incompetent persons and treating as absolute decisions made by competent
persons.165 Medical practice, too, does not extend “the principle of
autonomy” to incompetent persons.166 The Sell standard was created to
weigh the interests of a currently incompetent individual.167 It seems
likely, then, that a currently competent individual’s decision would be
granted more weight in a Sell-like balancing act.

2. Alternatively, More Process is Due
Even if the court did accurately value the interest at stake, however,
the existing procedures are insufficient to protect to the due process rights
of a defendant like Mitchell.168 The court seemed especially hesitant to
adopt a bright-line rule disallowing Sell’s application when the defendant
has been deemed competent.169 If historical precedent is the controlling
standard, as the Medina court suggested, a Sell hearing has never allowed
the State to medicate a currently competent defendant.170 Indeed, a
currently competent individual’s decision to refuse medical treatment has
historically been respected as part of the common law right against bodily
intrusions.171 This historical tradition alone should be sufficient, then, to
show that more procedural protections are required.
Defendants like Mitchell are not uncommon, however.172 And the
State’s contention that getting the timing “just right” to hold a proper Sell
Leo, supra note 116 (“…an adjudication of incompetency effectively denies
an individual autonomy to make decisions…”); see also Caitlin E. Borgmann, The
Constitutionality of Government-Imposed Bodily Intrusions, 2014 U. ILLINOIS L. REV.
1059, 1126 (2014) (“Forced bodily intrusions most commonly occur in three contexts:
when the recipient is sick, mentally incompetent, or suspected of a crime.").
166
If a person is deemed incompetent to make medical decisions, a surrogate
decision maker is appointed. B. Varkey, Principles of Clinical Ethics and Their
Application to Practice, 30 MED. PRINCIPLES & PRAC. 17, 19 (2021).
167
The Court’s reasoning is predicated on the fact that Dr. Sell was in fact
incompetent to stand trial at the time of the proceedings. If Dr. Sell had been
competent to stand trial at the time, the State would have no interest to justify
involuntary medication since Sell’s guilt or innocence could be adjudicated. See Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003).
168
This section responds to the potential counterargument that the criminal
context, as opposed to the civil context, creates a sufficiently compelling government
interest.
169
See Mitchell, 11 F.4th at 674.
170
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668 (No. 21-1174), 2021
WL 3619937.
171
Borgmann, supra note 164 (The Court declared, “No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others.” (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
172
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Mitchell, supra note 169.
165
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hearing would waste already-limited judicial resources is a valid one.173
So if a Sell hearing does not provide adequate due process protections,
what would?
Additional procedures are justified by the practical test announced in
Mathews.174 The affected private interest is certainly significant, if not
fundamental. Additional procedures are, in fact, necessary in cases of
cyclical competency since these cases are more likely to involve
individuals with marginal competency.175 Even Sell points toward using
additional procedures since a less restrictive alternative offers more
narrowly tailored results: applying a cognitive model to competency in the
criminal context.176

B. In the Case of Cyclical Competency: A Proposed Standard
Where a defendant is currently deemed competent to stand trial, the
government should be required to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant, more likely than not, will decompensate
without continued use of antipsychotic medication if the government

173

Id.
Mathews requires a court to consider three factors: “(1) the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976).
175
Lawyers and clinicians need to be more cautious with marginally competent
individuals to adequately safeguard their constitutional rights. See Jonathan Herring,
Entering the Fog: On the Borderlines of Mental Capacity, 83 IND. L.J. 1619, 1626
(2008). “Some individuals will have their decision-making authority unjustly
restricted while others will not receive adequate protections.” Andrew Peterson et al.,
Supported Decision Making with People at the Margins of Autonomy, 21 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 4, 6 (2021).
176
Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity,
Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 98 (2012) (“With
changes in medical practice, psychology, and a burgeoning legal framework of civil
rights and procedural due process, we have moved to a functional, cognitive
understanding of incapacity. This current paradigm leads to ‘tailored’ or limited
guardianships, which represent the least restrictive means of protection, the promotion
of greater autonomy for the incapacitated person, and robust procedural protections in
the determination of incapacity . . ..”). A cognitive model focuses on an individual’s
ability to make certain discrete decisions. Relevant here is the defendant’s ability to
competently refuse medication. If Sell continues to apply, then whether a defendant
has the right to refuse unwanted medication is tied to a determination of whether that
defendant is competent to stand trial. A cognitive model, on the other hand, considers
competency to refuse medication as a different evaluation than competency to stand
trial. See id. at 94–95, 98.
174
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wishes to pursue a court order authorizing involuntary medication.177 If
the Government meets this burden, the court should order an evaluation of
the defendant’s capacity to make an informed judgment about the
proposed medical treatment.178 Based on the capacity evaluation and other
relevant evidence, the court would determine whether the defendant is
competent to make an informed judgment regarding the proposed medical
treatment. This determination should be made considering three elements,
requiring that the defendant be able to: (1) communicate their treatment
choice; (2) understand and appreciate the relevant circumstances; and (3)
rationally relate their choice to the circumstances.179
If the court decides that the defendant is competent for this purpose,
and so long as the defendant, being fully informed, wishes to reaffirm their
refusal of the antipsychotic medication, the court should be required to
respect the defendant’s choice to refuse antipsychotic medication.180 This
would respect the right promulgated in Cruzan preserving a competent
individual’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.181 This would
also respect the distinction between prisoners and detainees which allows
detainees to invoke Due Process Clause protections to prevent further
infringement on their rights to life and liberty.182 Since Mitchell is
currently competent and his guilt or innocence has not yet been determined
for the crime for which he is being detained, Mitchell’s decisions for his
own medical treatment should be given the utmost respect.
If, on the other hand, the court determines that the defendant is
incompetent to make such decisions, the court should proceed to appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent the defendant’s interests as a potential

177
This initial standard serves a gatekeeping role to protect unwarranted
attempts by the government to obtain such an order. It is not an onerous burden on the
government, however, and remains in line with cases like Cooper v. Oklahoma, which
assert that standards in determining competency in the criminal context ought to be
more protective of the defendant’s rights. 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996); see also Barstow
et al., supra note 119, at 45 (“Determining that a patient lacks capacity and restricting
[their] autonomy require clear and convincing evidence that the patient’s decision will
cause unintended and irreparable harm. If there is uncertainty after conducting a full
capacity evaluation, the final judgment should err on the patient’s side.”). “This court
has mandated an intermediate standard of proof– ‘clear and convincing evidence’–
when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly
important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’” Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
178
This has also been called the competency to refuse medical treatment.
Barstow, supra note 119, at 40. This is different than a capacity determination, since
it would be done by a court rather than a clinician. Id.
179
See supra Part III (C)(2). Here, the second and third elements from the above
section are combined into a single element for simplicity.
180
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
181
Id.
182
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
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patient.183 The guardian ad litem would investigate and report their
findings to the court. 184 Using arguments by the defense counsel and the
recommendation of the guardian ad litem, the court would then decide
whether or not to authorize involuntary medication on a “best interests”
standard.185
This proposed approach meets the procedural due process
requirements laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge. Mathews requires
evaluation of additional procedures by considering three factors: (1) the
private interest affected by the government action; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable
value of other procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest,
which includes fiscal and administrative concerns.186 Courts should
follow two additional procedures: holding a hearing to legally determine
the defendant’s competency to refuse medication and, if necessary, the
appointment of a guardian ad litem to serve as a surrogate decision-maker.
Mitchell’s private interest has not changed and remains a significant
liberty interest.187 The risk that the Sell standard could erroneously deprive
him of this liberty interest is significant since the Sell standard was never
intended to allow the involuntary medication of a competent defendant.188
These proposed procedures give the private interest additional protection
in a different evaluation of competency. At the same time, they consider
the government’s interests in bringing defendants to trial and conserving
judicial resources by allowing involuntary medication to be administered
in some, although scarce, circumstances. The cyclical nature of the
defendant’s competency history even weighs in favor of these additional
procedures since they promise a definite end to the defendant’s journey
183
Fredrick E. Vars, The Value of a Guardian Ad Litem in a Sell Proceeding, 43
THE CHAMPION 16 (2019).
184
See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 878 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Vars, supra note
182 and Sarah E. Wolf, The Mentally Incompetent Criminal Defendant: United States
v. Weston and the Need for a Guardian Ad Litem, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071
(2002), for a more thorough discussion of the role of a guardian ad litem in this type
of context.
185
This means that the court will authorize involuntary medication if the
medication is, all things considered, in the defendant’s best interest. See Donna S.
Harkness, “Whenever Justice Requires”: Examining the Elusive Role of Guardian ad
Litem for Adults with Diminished Capacity, 8 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR 1, 27
(2006).
186
Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
187
See supra Part V (A)(1). For further discussion of the importance of this
liberty interest, including its potential and probable effects on the defendant’s right to
a fair trial see for example, Dora W. Klein, Unreasonable: Involuntary Medications,
Incompetent Criminal Defendants, and the Fourth Amendment, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
161, 191–96 (2009) and Brenda A. Likavec, Unforeseen Side Effects: The Impact of
Forcibly Medicating Criminal Defendants on Sixth Amendment Rights, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 455, 484–91 (2006).
188
See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003).
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through the overburdened competency evaluation system. And the use of
a guardian ad litem specifically is not unduly burdensome here since their
use should be relatively rare, and the probate courts already regularly
employ these individuals.189 Therefore, the proposed procedures are likely
sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.

VI. CONCLUSION
Johnathan Mitchell had been deemed competent to stand trial when a
judge ordered that he be involuntarily medicated.190 The circuit court, in
this case, nevertheless properly applied the standard enumerated in Sell v.
United States, a case in which a court had determined that the defendant
was incompetent to stand trial at the time of medication.191 The Sell
standard, however, was erroneously applied in Mr. Mitchell’s case at the
appellate level because the court did not, and cannot feasibly, take into
account the full scope of the liberty interests at stake.192
Even if the government did establish a sufficiently compelling state
interest, more process was due in this case. The court should employ two
additional procedures to help solve the problems created by continuous
cycles of decompensation in criminal defendants: a hearing to determine
competency to refuse medication and, if a defendant is deemed
incompetent to do so, appointment of a guardian ad litem to act as a
surrogate decisionmaker. Criminal defendants’ rights warrant the utmost
protection in our justice system, and these additional procedures are
needed to safeguard the rights of those defendants.

189
See, e.g., John D. Kershman, What is a guardian ad litem in Missouri? And,
what is the role of the guardian ad litem?, AHEARN KERSHMAN LLC BLOG (July 13,
2021), https://www.ak-stl.com/what-is-a-guardian-ad-litem-in-missouri--what-is-therole-of-the-guardian-ad-litem [https://perma.cc/27BG-LZGE].
190
United States v. Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668, 671–72 (2021).
191
Id. at 673–74; see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003).
192
See generally Mitchell, 11 F.4th 668, 673–74 (2021).
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